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Fuel Exports, Aid and Terrorism   
  
Abstract  
Purpose - This study employs interactive quantile regressions to assess the conditional role of 
foreign aid in reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports in 78 
developing countries for the period 1984-2008.  
  
Design/methodology/approach - Bilateral and multilateral aid indicators are used whereas 
terrorism includes: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. Interactive 
quantile regressions are used.   
  
Findings -   First, with the exception of unclear terrorism, bilateral aid can be used to mitigate 
the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports in bottom quintiles of the fuel export 
distribution. Second, multilateral aid can be used to reduce the negative effect of transnational 
terrorism on fuel exports exclusively in the highest (90th) quintile of fuel exports.  The 
corresponding modifying thresholds are within policy ranges disclosed in the summary 
statistics.    
  
Practical implications- While the policy instrument of bilateral aid is most relevant in 
countries with below-median fuel exports, the policy instrument of multilateral aid is effective 
with respect to transnational terrorism in countries with the highest levels of fuel exports.  
  
Originality/value –This study contributes to the literature on the role of external flows in reducing 
the negative externalities of terrorism on development outcomes.   
  
JEL Classification: F40; F23; F35;Q34 ; O40   
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1. Introduction  
 Over the past decades, terrorism and conflicts have substantially affected petrodollar or 
government revenues in oil-exporting countries. Some notable examples include: Nigeria’s oil 
Delta region with sabotage activities from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (Obi, 2010; Onuoba, 2010; Akpan et al., 2013; Taylor, 2014); recent Al-Qaeda attacks in 
In Amenas fuel installations of Algeria (Onyeji et al., 2014 ); massive disruption of Libyan oil 
production in the post-Gaddafi era (Gaub, 2014) and the Middle East conflict in which the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) now controlling about 90 percent of Syrian oil 
installations can only trade its piecemeal fuel exploration in black and informal markets (Le 
Billon, 2015; Celso, 2015).   
 In light of the above, a growing body of the literature has been focusing on instruments by 
which conflicts and terrorism can be mitigated. To the best of our knowledge, some of the 
documented instruments have included: the need for transparency (Bell et al., 2014), the 
relevance of respecting the rule of law (Choi, 2010), imperative for educational mechanisms 
(Brockhoff et al., 2014) like bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008), greater publicity and press 
freedom (Hoffman et al., 2013), behavioural investigations of attitudes towards terrorism 
(Gardner, 2007) and use of military tactics and strategies (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010).  
 Another interesting strand of studies has been oriented towards assessing linkages between 
terrorism, violence, political instability and macroeconomic factors. As far as we are aware,  
this stream of  the literature has focused on inter alia: (i) the effect of terrorism on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008), (ii) interconnections between terrorism and 
innovation (Koh, 2007), (iii) the growth-terrorism nexus, with bidirectional causality (Gries et 
al., 2011; Shahbaz et al., 2013;  Shahzad et al., 2015), causality to terrorism from growth 
(Piazza, 2006; Choi, 2015), causality from terrorism to growth (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008, 
2009, 2011;  Öcal & Yildirim,   2010; Meierrieks & Gries,  2013) and (iv) the relevance of 
foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect of terrorism on development outcomes 
like  external flows (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014), conditional on initial levels of external flows 
(Asongu et al., 2015) or corruption-control levels in the domestic countries (Efobi et al., 2015). 
The present line of inquiry is closest to the last stream. Accordingly, we aim to investigate the 
role of development assistance in reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel 
exports.   
 The literature on the terrorism-trade nexus can be discussed in three main streams, notably: (i) 
the impact of terrorism on trade, (ii) the effect of trade on terrorism and (iii) issues relating to 
the empirical modelling of the underlying relationships.   
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First, as concerns the incidence of terrorism on trade, four studies come to mind. First,  
Richardson (2004) has engaged security measures that were adopted after the September 11th 
2011 terrorists’ attacks in the United States. The plethora of resulting security initiatives has 
been partly motivated by the need to prevent the negative consequences of terrorism on world 
trade. (2) The impact of welfare and terror on trade openness has been investigated by Nitsch 
and Schumacher (2004). Employing an augmented gravity model on 200 countries for the 
period 1960-2003, the authors have used bilateral trade, violence and terrorism indicators to 
conclude that terrorism has a negative effect on trade openness. According to the narrative, a 
doubling of incidents of terrorism reduces bilateral trade by about 4 percent. (3) De Sousa et al. 
(2009a) have accessed the interplay between trade and nearness to the source of terror to 
establish the following key findings. (i) More robust investigations are needed to improve 
scholarly understanding as to how trade in the source-country and neighbouring countries are 
affected by terrorists incidents’ in the former. (ii) There is need for theoretical underpinnings 
to enhance clarity on linkages between transnational terrorism, trade and security policy. (4) As 
an extension of the previous study, De Sousa et al. (2009b) have examined the effect of 
international terrorism diffusion on trade and security. The empirical underpinnings are based 
on the assumption that proximity to terrorism is inversely related to the corresponding negative 
spillovers on trade. Moreover, the intuition for the study is consistent with the hypothesis that 
terror in a source country has negative effects to both the source-country itself and neighbouring 
nations simultaneously. On the other hand, countries that are more distantly-located from the 
‘source-country of terror’ could be endowed with positive externalities in terms of incremental 
trade,  related/corresponding to the decreasing trade from the country affected by terror and/or 
countries in the immediate neighbourhood of the country affected by terror. Overall, three  main 
findings were established. They are: (i) there is a direct negative effect of transnational terrorism 
on trade, (ii) an indirect negative effect of terrorism from the source-country to neighbouring 
countries is apparent and (iii) terrorism increases trade in countries that are remote from the 
‘source-country of terror’.   
 Second, coming to the impact of trade on terrorism, two studies in the limited literature have 
caught our attention. These have essentially been focused on the commercialisation of illegal 
drugs. (1) Piazza (2011) examined the link between the ‘drugs trade’ and terrorism on the 
hypothesis that illicit ‘drugs trade’ fuels terrorism. The author has concluded that ‘cocaine 
production’ and illicit drugs are significant drivers of transnational and domestic terrorism. 
Conversely, banning drugs and eradicating illicit crop cultivation leads to the opposite outcome. 
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As an extension, Piazza (2012) investigated the connection between the opium trade and 
terrorism in 34 Afghan provinces for the period 1996-2008 using binomial regressions. The 
author concluded that provinces where opium is substantially produced are associated with 
relatively higher rates of terrorist attacks and casualties. Therefore, there is a direction of 
causality flowing from the production of opium to terrorism.   
 Third, in the strand on empirical modelling concerns pertaining to the  trade-terrorism 
relationship, Mirza and Verdier (2008) surveyed the literature and documented four main 
cautions that should be borne in mind by researchers when investigating the underlying 
association. They comprise the need to: (i) account for omitted indictors that are very likely to 
be correlated with trade and terrorism, (ii) acknowledge the inter-temporal persistence of 
terrorism, (iii) distinguish between the effects of country-specific occurrences from the impact 
of incidents focused on the source-country and (iv) control for endogeneity.   
 The above literature leaves room for improvement in at least four major areas. They relate to 
the imperative of: (i) accounting for more dynamics of terrorism, (ii) exploring linkages 
between foreign policy in the underlying trade-terrorism relationship, (iii) considering specific 
dimensions of trade openness and (iv) adopting more robust empirical techniques that control 
for initial trade levels. We may deal with each in turn.  
First, building on the caution sustained by Choi (2015) on the imperative of exploring 
more indicators when assessing the nexus between terrorism and macroeconomic indicators, 
we involve a plethora of terrorism indicators in order to provide room for more policy 
implications, notably: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism. Consideration of 
these measurements of terrorism is in accordance with recent studies on the nexus between 
terrorism and macroeconomic indicators (Efobi et al., 2015). Moreover, the adoption of more 
terrorism indicators is partially motivated by the need to augment the engaged literature, which 
has been focused on few indicators, notably: (i) transnational terrorism in De Sousa et al. 
(2009ab) and (ii) domestic and transnational terrorism in Piazza (2011).   
 Second, in line with Choi (2015), we attempt to create space for a detailed discussion on policy 
outcomes, by limiting our investigation to the recent body of literature that has employed 
foreign aid as a policy variable in mitigating the hypothetically/documented negative effects of 
terrorism on foreign investment (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Asongu et al., 2015; Efobi et al., 
2015). To this end, we employ two foreign aid variables, namely multilateral and bilateral aid. 
The motivation for involving this policy indicator is based on the exploratory (Richardson, 
2014) and empirical (De Sousa et al., 2009ab) underpinnings which show that terrorism reduces 
trade openness.    
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 Third, it is imperative to engage trade-specific dimensions for more targeted policy 
implications. To this end: (i) contrary to previous studies that have used broad trade openness 
indicators (Richardson, 2004; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004; De Sousa et al., 2009ab) and (ii) 
consistent with the stream of literature using export-specific variables (Piazza, 2011, 2012),  we 
confined the analytical scope to fuel exports. The choice of fuel exports has a twofold 
inspiration, on the one hand, the recent growth resurgence in developing countries has been 
substantially driven by natural resources  (Amavilah, 2016) especially fuel exports, and (ii) on 
the other, as we have seen in the first paragraph here, terrorist activities have substantially 
affected fuel exports in recent decades.  
 Fourth, motivated by the recommendation of Mirza and Verdier (2008) on the imperative for 
more robust empirical strategies, we adopt an estimation technique that is robust to outliers. 
Moreover, the adopted Qauntile regression strategy also enables us to distinguish between 
initial levels of fuel exports. Accordingly, blanket policies based on the investigated 
relationships may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of fuel exports 
and tailored distinctly across high- and low-‘fuel exporting’ countries.   
 With the above interesting background, this line of inquiry is positioned on investigating the 
role of development assistance in dampening the negative effects of terrorism on fuel exports. 
The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the period 1984 to 2008. There 
are at least four reasons for our choice of periodicity and sample. First, the starting year is 1984 
because institutional data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is only available 
from this year. Second, the focus on developing countries is in tune with Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2009) who have established that negative consequences from terrorism are more apparent in 
developing countries vis-à-vis advanced nations. This is essentially because; the latter countries 
have the financial, logical and technological means needed to absorb the negative effects of 
terrorism without substantial macroeconomic consequences. Third, development assistance is 
principally channelled from more advanced economies to less developed countries. Hence, the 
empirical scope on these underdeveloped countries, contingent on a foreign aid variable is 
naturally justified. Fourth, a motivation for the present study is also to compare findings with 
those of the available literature that employed the same sample and periodicity, particularly:  
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), Efobi et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2015).    
The positioning of this inquiry steers clear of recent literature on international business 
and strategic management on the relationship between conflicts and development outcomes. In 
particular,  studies on: the identification of antecedents for, and consequences of low intensity 
inter-unit conflict in Multinational Companies (MNCs) (Lauring et al., 2017), the exploration 
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of how and why MNCs proactively address the concern of uncertainty by valuing locational 
ambidexterity in decision making (Huang & John, 2017), the relevance of political risk (law 
and order, internal conflict, ethnic tension  and interstate military conflict and security alliances) 
in determining foreign direct and indirect investments in developing countries (Al-Khouri, 
2015; Li & Vashchilko, 2010),  strategies of MNCs in which terrorism is factored-in as a 
fundamental threat (Suder & Czinkota, 2005), macroeconomic models of political risk 
assessments (Alon & Martin, 1998), the effects of risks (political, economic, default and credit) 
on the allocative efficiency of global financial markets (Ramcharran, 2003), dimensions of 
vulnerability and foreign multinationals' exit from war-afflicted countries (Dai et al., 2016), 
development of global strategic models and their implementation  in assessing how 
contemporary terrorist attacks affect the performance of MNCs (Li et al., 2005),  the relevance 
firms experience in impact-disasters on their ability to expand to countries experiencing 
disasters (Oetzel & Oh, 2013) and the effects of disasters (natural and man-made) on 
international trade (Oh, 2017).   
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Stylized facts, theoretical underpinnings and 
international business and strategy are presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data and 
methodology.  The empirical results, discussion and policy implications are covered in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future research.  
  
2. Stylized Facts, Theoretical Underpinnings and International Business and Strategy  2. 
1 Stylized facts and theoretical underpinnings     
According to the Global Peace Index (GPI), over 13 percent of the global Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in  2014 was lost to violence-related expenditure (Anderson, 2015). According 
to the report, approximately 14.3 trillion USD or 13.4 percent of Global GDP was invested in 
curtailing violence, crimes, conflicts, political instability and terrorism. The underlying 
expenditure is equivalent to the combined GDP of Germany, Spain, France, Canada, Brazil and 
the United Kingdom. Consistent with the report, a substantial amount of the expenditure is 
skewed towards terrorism-related activities. Projections show that terrorists’ activities are likely 
to increase in the coming years owing to burgeoning terrorism networks which have been 
proliferating in operational scope, representing about a 61 percent rise in killings as of 2014 
compared to 2008.   
The 2014 GPI account is supported by the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 
13), which concluded that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, terrorism has substantially 
increased.  As cases of reference to this point, six main stylized facts are apparent to the best of 
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our knowledge (Asongu et al. 2015). First, Libya in the post-Gaddafi era has become a failed 
state, with widespread anarchy and societal breakdown, characterised by various rebel factions 
and two rival governments clamouring to dictate the law of the land and run a substantially 
deteriorated oil-dependent economy. Second, the situation in Yemen has severely deteriorated 
with the inability of the government to honour the terms of its socioeconomic contracts with 
the Yemini citizens after the overthrow of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. As we write this paper, 
a proxy war is being fought between Iran and Saudi Arabia who are supporting rebels and the 
government respectively. Third, the 2015 Garissa university killings and 2013 Westgate 
shopping mall attacks by Al-Shabab in Kenya have illustrated that the Somali Al-Quaeda 
affiliated Al-Shabab can inflict substantial transnational terrorism causalities which have 
significant disruptive consequences to education and tourism. Fourth, in Tunisia after a wave 
of post-Arab Spring political assassinations, the newly democratically elected government is 
being seriously confronted with a wave of touristtargeted attacks, namely the: the Bardo 
National Museum and Sousse attacks in March and June of 2015 respectively. Fifth, the Boko 
Haram of Nigeria is extending its terrorism sphere to the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, 
Niger and Chad. Sixth, externalities of the Iraq and Syria conflicts have produced a very 
powerful ISIL that is now exerting substantial geopolitical effects throughout the world, namely 
the: (i) December 2014 hostage crisis in  Sydney-Australia, (ii) January 2015 foiled Verviers-
Belgium attacks, (iii) January 2015   
‘Charlie Hebdo’ attacks in Paris-France and (iv) the foiled February 2015 Australian attacks, inter 
alia.  
 Whereas there are some externalities in the developed world, it is important to note that a 
substantial number of terrorist activities are perpetrated in the developing world (Anderson, 
2015).  This has increased poverty-related concerns in policy-making circles, given that the 
year 2014 registered the highest number of internally displaced persons since the Second World 
War. This finding by the 2015 GPI report1 presents a bleak prospect for developing countries 
when combined with the mid-April 2015 publication by the World Bank of its World 
Development Indicators. The latter report  concluded that many developing countries, 
especially  those in Sub-Saharan Africa have still a long way to go in attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015; Caulderwood, 2015). 
Given that most of the growth needed to alleviate  poverty in developing countries is resource-
                                                 
1 The 2014 GPI should not be confused with the 2015 GPI report because the latter documents the former.   
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driven, understanding the role of foreign aid in reducing the potentially negative effect of 
terrorism on fuel exports is a line of inquiry of considerable policy relevance.    
 Consistent with the recommendation of De Sousa et al. (2009a) on the need to clearly articulate 
theoretical concepts motivating studies investigating the relationship between terrorism and 
macroeconomic variables, we briefly highlight the theories underpinning the present line of 
inquiry. In line with the underlying terrorism literature (Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015), 
two main theories which are documented by Akinwale (2010, p. 125) are used to provide  the 
foundations for the current study, namely: the Conflict Management Model (CMM) of Thomas-
Kilman (1992) and the Social Control Theory (SCT) from Black (1990).  Under the CMM, 
intentions of strategic character have a high likelihood of rotating around a two-factor matrix 
(of assertiveness and cooperation), when combined with collaboration produce five principal 
styles of conflict management, namely: avoidance, compromise, collaboration, competition and 
accommodation. On the other hand, according to the SCT, relationships between organisations, 
individuals and groups influence the exercise of one out of five main channels of social control, 
involving: negotiation, avoidance, settlement, self-help and tolerance. This theoretical basis is 
consistent with the conflict management and peace literature (Borg, 1992; Volkema & 
Bergmann, 1995) and in agreement with the present  study because foreign aid is employed as 
a policy variable in order to provide an enabling environment for the mitigation of terrorism, 
especially: (i) the improvement of government expenditure according to Gaibulloev and 
Sandler (2009) and (ii) education and the rule of law (Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; 
Heyneman, 2008a, 2008b; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009), among others.   
  
2.2 International business and strategy   
There are various international business approaches that are adopted by managers of MNCs to 
reduce the effects of terrorism on the cost of doing business internally. Consistent with 
Mazzarella (2005), this section is organised in two main strands, namely: (i) identifying the 
cost of terrorism in international business and (ii) managing the risk associated with terrorism.  
With respect to the management of the risk that terrorism poses to MNCs, two points are worth 
emphasising.  They are: (i) terrorism management methods and (ii) risk modelling.  On the one 
hand, minimising the cost of terrorism fundamentally depends on risk modelling effectiveness. 
The standard contemporary practice for most managers consists of estimating future loses with 
computer risk modelling which uses physical security analysis as inputs to determine the 
probability of attacks from terrorists and the potential level of damages. This ultimately informs 
the managers on the level of terrorism related risk insurance coverage needed for a particular 
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business operation.  On the other hand, there are various terrorism risk management methods 
that are adopted by managers, notably: maintaining good human rights and environmental 
records within regions in which they operate; using subcontractors to reduce further risk; hiring 
more security consultants and personnel; hardening of work sites and physical assets and 
training of personnel to avoid being the target of terrorism.   
 The potential costs of terrorism in international business can be seen from four main angles, 
namely: (i) improving the physical security of personnel, plant and equipment, (ii) hiring 
security consultants, (iii) improving global supply chains by securing the transportation of 
commodities as well as the risks related to the disruption of global sources of supply, (iii) 
reducing direct operations and investment in areas of high risk and (iv) political risk insurance.   
 The above theoretical underpinnings are broadly consistent with the recent international 
business literature on the strategies of managing the negative externalities of terrorism, namely: 
planning for potential effects of terrorism (Harvey et al., 2017) the management of people in 
hostile environments (Barder et al., 2015), especially expatriate personnel (Barder & Berg, 
2014a; Bader et al., 2016; Barder & Berg, 2014b) and Corporate Social Responsibility by 
MNCs as a strategic management tool (Agwu & Taylor, 2015).   
  
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data  
  We examine a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008 from 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015). The choice of sample and periodicity has already 
been justified in the introduction2. The data entails non-overlapping intervals in terms of three-year 
averages. The dependent variable is ‘fuel exports’ while the independent variables of interest are 
indicators of terrorism, namely: unclear, domestic, transnational and total terrorism dynamics. Two 
foreign aid variables are employed: multilateral and bilateral aid.    
 The variables are originally from three principal sources, namely: (i) the incidence of terrorism 
from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012), (ii) the Global Terrorism Database and 
(iii) the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Three main justifications influence 
the choice of periodicity and sample. First, in accordance with Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), 
relative to more advanced economies, the negative consequences of terrorism are visible in 
developing nations. As we said earlier, this asymmetric effect is essentially because, developing 
countries do not have the adequate financial, logistical and technological mechanisms that are 
needed to absorb the negative consequences associated with terrorism. Second, foreign aid is 
logically channelled to developing nations from their more developed counterparts. Third, we 
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aim to compare the findings established with a stream of literature that has used the same 
database, notably Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015).   
We define terrorism as the actual and threatened use of force by sub-national actors with 
the principal mission of using intimidation to secure political ambitions (see Enders & Sandler, 
2006). The terrorism indicators measure the number of yearly terrorism incidents registered in 
a country. In order to reduce mathematical concerns that are linked to logtransforming zeros 
and correct the positive skew in the data, the study uses the natural logarithm of terrorism 
incidents by adding one to the base.  Such a transformation procedure is consistent with recent 
terrorism literture (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). Terrorism-specific 
definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of 
terrorist activities that involve[s] the nationals of the venue country: implying that the 
perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from  
                                                           
2 The adopted countries include: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia,  
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, Tunisia, 
Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, Brazil, 
Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon,  
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, Malta, 
Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, Morocco, 
Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan”.  
  
the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism 
that concern[s] at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and 
incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”. Unclear 
terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as 
domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, 
transnational and unclear terrorisms.  
The dependent variable, aid and control covariates are from the World Bank 
Development Indicators. We also take the natural logarithm of fuel exports. Therefore exports 
of value zero are considered as missing data after the log transformation.  The three countries 
without any data on fuel exports are Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. The concern of zeros is more apparent in the count data (i.e. terrorism variables) than 
in fuel exports. The development assistance data are disbursements of aid from the 
Development Assistance Committee countries.    
The control variables comprise: trade openness, exchange rate, infrastructure, political 
globalisation, inflation and internal conflicts. The choice of control variables is in accordance 
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with the FDI-terrorism literature (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). Based on our 
expectations, infrastructural development, increasing exchange rates and trade openness should 
have positive effects on fuel exports (Akpan, 2014), while civil/internal conflicts and inflation 
should exert opposite effects. For example, high exchange rates have been documented to boost 
exports in developing countries (Rodrik, 2008). Whereas stable and low inflation is conducive 
for economic prosperity, chaotic inflation may decrease fuel exports owing to a negative 
economic outlook. This is essentially because investors have been shown to prefer strategies of 
investment that are void of ambiguity (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). The expected sign of 
political globalisation cannot be established a priori because it depends to a great extent on 
leverage in decision making at the international level. The definitions of variables are provided 
in Appendix 1.   
The summary statistics of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. From it, two points 
are note worthy. On the one hand, the means of the variables are comparable. On the other, 
based on the variations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated relations would emerge. 
The objective of the correlation matrix presented in Appendix 3 is to examine and avoid 
potential concerns of multicollinearity which we have highlighted in bold. We observe from 
this matrix that terrorism and foreign aid variables are highly correlated among themselves. 
Hence, we avoid employing more than two foreign aid and terrorism variables in the same 
specification.   
    
3.2 Methodology  
In accordance with the underlying literature on conditional macroeconomic 
determinants (Billger & Goel, 2009; Asongu et al., 2015), in order to examine if initial levels 
of fuel exports matter in how the independent variables interplay in influencing fuel exports, 
we employ a quantile regression (QR) estimation strategy. It entails, investigating the 
determinants of fuel exports throughout the conditional distributions of fuel exports (Keonker 
& Hallock, 2001).   
Previous literature on linkages between terrorism and macroeconomic variables has 
reported parameters estimates at the conditional mean of macroeconomic indicators 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). Whereas mean impacts are certainly relevant, 
we extend the underlying stream of terrorism studies by employing QR which distinguishes 
between initial export levels. For instance, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is based on the 
supposition that error terms and the dependent variable are normally  distributed, the QR 
approach is not founded on the hypothesis of normally distributed error  terms. Hence, this 
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strategy enables us to examine the impacts on the dependent variable with particular emphasis 
on low- medium- and high-fuel exporting countries. Accordingly, with QR, parameter estimates 
are derived at multiple points on the conditional distributions of fuel exports (Keonker & 
Hallock, 2001). The QR technique is increasingly being employed in development literature, 
notably in corruption studies (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012).   
 In the light of the above, the main advantage of the QR approach adopted by this study is that, 
it will consider the entire distribution of fuel exports: countries with high, medium and low 
levels of fuel exports. Hence, the advantage of this approach over a technique based on mean 
values of the dependent variable (e.g. OLS) is that existing levels of fuel exports are considered. 
In so doing, policy implications resulting from the findings can be tailored towards countries 
with specific levels of fuel exports. Accordingly, with the OLS approach, results and policy 
recommendations are identical for all sampled countries.   
The th quantile estimator of fuel exports is obtained by solving for the optimization 
problem in Eq. (1), which is presented without subscripts for ease presentation and of 
simplicity.   
 
minRk i i: yi x i  yi xi i i: yi xi ( 1 )yi xi    ,                                          
(1)  
 
  
where 0,1 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations is minimised, for instance 
the 25th or 75th quintiles (with =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately weighing the 
residuals. The conditional quantile of fuel exports or yi given xi is:  
Qy( / xi) xi  ,                                                                                                         (2)  
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each th specific quintile. This formulation is 
analogous to E(y/ x) xi in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the mean 
of the conditional distribution of fuel exports. For the model in Eq. (2) the dependent variable 
yi is the fuel exports indicator while xi contains a constant term, trade openness, inflation, 
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infrastructure, exchange rates, political globalisation and civil/internal conflicts. The 
specifications in Eq. (1) are tailored to mitigate the multicollinearity concerns highlighted in 
Appendix 3.  
 Considering that the strategy of estimation we have adopted involves interactive regressions, 
we briefly engage Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls of interactive regressions. For the 
estimation output to have economic meaning, the corresponding estimated interactive 
coefficients should be interpreted as conditional marginal effects. Moreover, the modifying or 
foreign aid indicator should be within the range provided by the summary statistics for the 
overall marginal effect to have economic meaning.    
  
4. Empirical Analysis  
4.1 Presentation of results   
 Table 1 and Table 2 present results corresponding to bilateral aid and multilateral aid 
regressions respectively. All the tables entail four-sets of specifications. They are: (i) domestic 
and transnational terrorism modelling in Panel A and (ii) unclear and total terrorism estimations 
in Panel B.  More specifically, the left-hand-side (LHS) of Panel A (B) display findings for 
domestic (unclear) terrorism whereas the right-hand-side (RHS) of Panel A (B) show results 
for transnational (total) terrorism. For either table, we consistently notice that the QR estimates 
are different from the OLS estimates in terms of signs and significance. This further justifies 
the relevance of the QR strategy.   
The following findings can be established with respect to Table 1 on linkages between 
fuel exports, bilateral aid and terrorism dynamics. First, with the exception of domestic 
terrorism which is not significant across fuel export distributions, the effects of terrorism are 
consistently significant in the 50th and 90th quintiles. While these underlying effects are positive 
for unclear terrorism, the impact in the 50th and 90th quintiles are respectively positive and 
negative for transnational and total terrorism. Second, bilateral aid consistently increases 
(decreases) fuel exports at the bottom (top) quintiles. Third, interaction effects between bilateral 
aid and terrorism dynamics are overwhelmingly not significant, but for the 50th and 90th 
quintiles on the LHS of Panel B in unclear terrorism regressions for which the effects are 
negative. The corresponding modifying bilateral aid thresholds are within the range (0.765 to 
8.362) provided by the summary statistics, notably: (i) 5.702 (0.211/0.037) for the 50th quintiles 
and (ii) 4.750 (0.133/0.028) for the 90th quintile. Fourth, most of the control variables are 
significant with the expected signs. Infrastructural development and political globalisation are 
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positively associated with resource exports (Apkan, 2014). The sparsely positive effect of 
civil/internal conflict is consistent with the effects of terrorism while the scantily positive 
impact of inflation may be traceable to stable consumer prices (with a mean value of 2.414).  
  
Table 1: Fuel Exports, Bilateral Aid, Terrorism   
 
             
Constant  -5.63**  -13.41**  -8.511**  -6.925**  1.394  2.826**  -5.873**  -14.76**  -7.634*  -8.09***  0.779  2.975**  
  (0.035)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.034)  (0.616)  (0.052)  (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.055)  (0.007)  (0.775)  (0.010)  
Domter  0.005  0.004  -0.0007  0.026  0.004  -0.006  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.636)  (0.835)  (0.950)  (0.104)  (0.663)  (0.127)              
Tranater  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.107  -0.010  0.152  0.187*  0.096  -0.075*  
              (0.148)  (0.952)  (0.275)  (0.092)  (0.280)  (0.068)  
LnBilaid  0.112  0.586**  0.372  0.233  -0.234  - 
0.195***  
0.136  0.530*  0.369**  0.367**  -0.232  -0.200***  
  (0.403)  (0.020)  (0.320)  (0.137)  (0.116)  (0.00)  (0.318)  (0.061)  (0.049)  (0.010)  (0.114)  (0.000)  
Domter×LnBilaid  -0.001  0.0004  -0.0004  -0.004  -0.001  0.0004  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.568)  (0.915)  (0.838)  (0.150)  (0.429)  (0.573)              
Tranater× LnBilaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.018  0.005  -0.024  -0.029  -0.022  0.011  
              (0.180)  (0.885)  (0.311)  (0.143)  (0.182)  (0.190)  
LnTrade  -0.296  -1.051*  -0.568  -0.137  0.236  0.166  -0.252  -1.170  -0.589  -0.028  0.249  0.190  
  (0.283)  (0.099)  (0.131)  (0.695)  (0.380)  (0.190)  (0.359)  (0.101)  (0.182)  (0.928)  (0.353)  (0.066)  
LnInflation  -0.031  -0.065  -0.080  -0.058  0.175  0.085  -0.044  -0.047  -0.105  -0.082  0.128  0.084*  
  (0.742)  (0.750)  (0.520)  (0.654)  (0.116)  (0.107)  (0.638)  (0.836)  (0.469)  (0.484)  (0.274)  (0.053)  
LnInfrastructure   0.422***  0.689*  0.409*  0.506  0.215  0.049  0.408**  0.663  0.433*  0.513***  0.238  0.032  
  (0.008)  (0.075)  (0.064)  (0.012)  (0.231)  (0.552)  (0.011)  (0.125)  (0.088)  (0.005)  (0.173)  (0.649)  
LnXrate (Exchange rate)  -0.028  0.005  -0.071  -0.017  0.023  0.013  -0.030  -0.011  -0.067  -0.029  0 .016  0.012  
  (0.506)  (0.959)  (0.169)  (0.713)  (0.618)  (0.433)  (0.474)  (0.926)  (0.257)  (0.496)  (0.719)  (0.521)  
Ln (Political globalisation)   1.612***  2.720**  1.998***  1.631**  0.283  0.302  1.607***  3.248**  1.798**  1.635***  0.447  0.265  
  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.646)  (0.313)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.028)  (0.008)  (0.451)  (0.274)  
Civil Conflicts   0.104  -0.059  0.074  0.035  0.177  0.138***  0.088  -0.0009  0.082  0.011  0.151  0.109***  
  (0.257)  (0.780)  (0.512)  (0.733)  (0.044)  (0.000)  (0.325)  (0.997)  (0.531)  (0.896)  (0.101)  (0.002)  
             
Pseudo R²/R²  0.063  0.120  0.072  0.040  0.038  0.050  0.065  0.118  0.072  0.043  0.035  0.046  
Fisher   3.21***  
          3.45***            
Observations   448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  
  
  
 
  
 
  OLS  Q.10  Q.25  Q.50  Q.75  Q.90  OLS  Q.25  Q.50  Q.90  
                        
Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism    
            Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) 
  Total Terrorism (Totter)   
  Q.10 
  Q.75   
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Constant  -5.457**  -14.7***  -7.904**  -6.934*  1.539  2.846**  -5.650**  - 
14.24***  
-8.166**  -7.437**  1.440  2.923**  
  (0.042)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.057)  (0.510)  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.646)  (0.012)  
Unclter   0.073  0.074  -0.009  0.211*  0.042  0.133***  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.450)  (0.618)  (0.914)  (0.096)  (0.482)  (0.000)              
Totter  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.006  0.005  -0.0007  0.022*  0.004  -0.005**  
              (0.541)  (0.735)  (0.935)  (0.065)  (0.587)  (0.043)  
LnBilaid  0.114  0.692**  0.365**  0.275  -0.221*  -0.177**  0.117  0.648**  0.388**  0.252*  -0.234  -0.192***  
  (0.388)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.110)  (0.095)  (0.010)  (0.386)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.081)  (0.165)  (0.001)  
Unclter ×LnBilaid  -0.014  -0.011  -0.001  -0.037*  -0.012  - 
0.028***  
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.370)  (0.698)  (0.943)  (0.095)  (0.213)  (0.000)              
Totter×LnBilaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.001  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.003  -0.001  0.0004  
              (0.474)  (0.941)  (0.872)  (0.102)  (0.385)  (0.409)  
LnTrade  -0.326  -1.146*  -0.571  -0.288  0.207  0.184  -0.298  -1.093*  -0.560  -0.134  0.229  0.157  
  (0.241)  (0.079)  (0.193)  (0.465)  (0.375)  (0.119)  (0.282)  (0.074)  (0.128)  (0.678)  (0.454)  (0.144)  
LnInflation  -0.038  0.002  -0.091  -0.036  0.145  0.074*  -0.032  -0.021  -0.079  -0.056  0.173  0.086**  
  (0.676)  (0.991)  (0.462)  (0.802)  (0.149)  (0.087)  (0.733)  (0.913)  (0.526)  (0.639)  (0.168)  (0.046)  
LnInfrastructure   0.419***  0.726*  0.417*  0.536**  0.233  0.012  0.422***  0.749*  0.423**  0.479**  0.221  0.052  
  (0.009)  (0.082)  (0.055)  (0.017)  (0.131)  (0.887)  (0.008)  (0.058)  (0.046)  (0.010)  (0.278)  (0.460)  
LnXrate (Exchange rate)  -0.029  0.028  -0.078  0.002  0.019  0.005  -0.028  0.021  -0.073  -0.024  0.022  0.014  
  (0.496)  (0.802)  (0.128)  (0.964)  (0.634)  (0.764)  (0.502)  (0.843)  (0.135)  (0.589)  (0.678)  (0.340)  
Ln (Political globalisation)   1.604***  2.940***  1.868***  1.676**  0.272  0.289  1.614***  2.819***  1.883***  1.734***  0.281  0.283  
  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.027)  (0.601)  (0.300)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.687)  (0.246)  
Civil Conflicts   0.109  0.024  0.060  0.059  0.169**  0.101***  0. 106  -0.056  0.064  0.039  0.178*  0.139***  
  (0.176)  (0.897)  (0.564)  (0.577)  (0.020)  (0.000)  (0.251)  (0.786)  0.552)  (0.675)  (0.077)  (0.000)  
             
             
Pseudo R²/R²  0.065  0.118  0.073  0.041  0.041  0.053  0.0638  0.119  0.073  0.041  0.039  0.050  
Fisher   3.31***  
        3.21***              
Observations   448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  448  
             
 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² 
for quantile regression. Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Fuel Exports is least.  
  
The following findings can be established from Table 2 on linkages between fuel 
exports, multilateral aid and terrorism dynamics. First, the effects of terrorism are consistently 
significant in the highest and lowest quintiles, especially with: (i) positive effects in the 90th  
quintiles for total terrorism and domestic terrorism; (ii) a negative impact in the 90th quintile 
for transnational terrorism and (iii) positive impacts in the 10th and 25th quintiles for unclear 
terrorism. Second, multilateral aid steadily decreases fuel exports at the top quintiles (50th to 
90th) for the most part. Third, interaction effects between multilateral aid and terrorism 
dynamics are significantly negative, but for transnational terrorism in the RHS of Panel A. 
Moreover, the corresponding modifying thresholds of multilateral aid are within the range 
provided by the summary statistics, particularly: -1.249 to 7.105. Accordingly, there is: (i) a 
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negative threshold of  2.000 (0.004/0.002) for domestic terrorism in the 90th quintile; (ii)  a 
positive threshold of 4.600 (0.046/0.010) for transnational terrorism in the 90th quintile; (iii) a 
negative threshold of  4.941  (0.084/0.017) for unclear terrorism in the 25th quintile  and (iv) a 
negative threshold of  1.500 (0.003/0.002) for total terrorism in the 90th quintile. Fourth, the 
discourse on the significant control variables is consistent with that on Table 1.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 2: Fuel Exports, Multilateral aid, Terrorism   
 
  
 
  
 
  
                    
Dependent Variable: ln (Fuel Exports)  
 
 
          Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism     
       
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter)  Transnational Terrorism (Tranater)  
 
 
  
 
Constant  
 
OLS  
 
Q.10  
 
Q.25  
 
Q.50  
 
Q.75  
 
Q.90  
 
OLS  
 
Q.10  
 
Q.25  
 
Q.50  
 
Q.75  
 
Q.90  
 
-5.567**  
 
- 
15.35***  
 
-9.75***  
 
-7.24***  
 
1.028  
 
1.290  
 
-5.586**  
 
- 
16.24***  
 
- 
11.26***  
 
-7.181***  
 
2.533  
 
1.184  
  (0.032)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.722)  (0.404)  (0.032)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.417)  (0.451)  
Domter  0.006**  0.011  0.009  0.008  -0.001  0.004***  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.044)  (0.303)  (0.122)  (0.158)  (0.779)  (0.006)              
Tranater  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.039*  0.042  0.067  0.046  -0.005  -0.046***  
              (0.086)  (0.672)  (0.142)  (0.190)  (0.908)  (0.000)  
LnMulaid  -0.173  -0.136  -0.093  -0.179  -0.324**  - 
0.202***  
-0.173  -0.169  -0.135  -0.215**  -0.353**  -0.231***  
  (0.147)  (0.677)  (0.556)  (0.100)  (0.010)  (0.000)  (0.171)  (0.618)  (0.447)  (0.035)  (0.011)  (0.000)  
Domter×LnMulaid  -0.001**  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002*  -0.0008  - 
0.002***  
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.029)  (0.715)  (0.156)  (0.069)  (0.526)  (0.000)              
Tranater×LnMulaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.011*  -0.003  -0.014  -0.012  -0.007  0.010*  
              (0.086)  (0.822)  (0.225)  (0.206)  (0.527)  (0.063)  
LnTrade  -0.363  -0.930  -0.728*  -0.219  0.232  0.373**  -0.337  -1.013  -0.531  -0.183  0.133  0.357**  
  (0.193)  (0.216)  (0.062)  (0.414)  (0.402)  (0.010)  (0.227)  (0.201)  (0.230)  (0.464)  (0.659)  (0.013)  
LnInflation  -0.038  -0.435*  -0.094  -0.028  0.141  0.109*  -0.036  -0.347  -0.061  -0.002  0.078  0.107  
  (0.696)  (0.077)  (0.458)  (0.780)  (0.267)  (0.081)  (0.704)  (0.176)  (0.667)  (0.977)  (0.568)  (0.071)  
LnInfrastructure   0.221  0.313  0.084  0.327*  0.091  0.009  0.213  0.255  0.042  0.192  0.086  -0.015  
  (0.216)  (0.530)  (0.725)  (0.052)  (0.650)  (0.934)  (0.232)  (0.613)  (0.871)  (0.214)  (0.696)  (0.887)  
LnXrate (Exchange rate)  -0.005  -0.080  -0.058  0.048  0.060  0.019  -0.005  -0.077  -0.066  0.033  0.082  0.028  
  (0.908)  (0.549)  (0.269)  (0.211)  (0.228)  (0.315)  (0.905)  (0.566)  (0.279)  (0.363)  (0.139)  (0.272)  
Ln (Political globalisation)   2.052***  4.332***  3.142***  2.270***  0.448  0.419  2.033***  4.670***  3.346***  2.319***  0.235  0.488  
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  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.488)  (0.241)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.735)  (0.167)  
Civil Conflicts   0.135  0.099  0.124  0.207**  0.079  0.180***  0.118  0.125  0.124  0.106  0.070  0.109**  
  
 
(0.144)  
 
(0.676)  
 
(0.259)  
 
(0.010)  
 
(0.401)  
 
(0.000)  
 
(0.178)  
 
(0.623)  
 
(0.319)  
 
(0.134)  
 
(0.490)  
 
(0.018)  
 
 
Pseudo R²/R²  
 
0.074  
 
0.114  
 
0.074  
 
0.047  
 
0.056  
 
0.062  
 
0.073  
 
0.110  
 
0.073  
 
0.046  
 
0.054  
 
0.054  
Fisher  5.38***  
          4.73***            
Observations   444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Unclear Terrorism 
(Unclter) 
            
Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
           
   Total Terrorism (Totter) 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
OLS  
   
Q.10  Q.25  Q.50  Q.75  Q.90  OLS  Q.10  Q.25  Q.50  Q.75  
Q.90  
                         
Constant  -5.485**  - - -7.43***  3.233  1.546  -5.547**  - -9.86***  -7.510***  1.071  1.248  
 17.04***  10.07***  15.25***  
  (0.036)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.240)  (0.295)  (0.033)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.706)  (0.420)  
Unclter   0.053**  0.142*  0.084**  0.055  -0.013  0.0006  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.020)  (0.055)  (0.014)  (0.174)  (0.786)  (0.961)              
Totter  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.005**  0.009  0.007  0.006  0.0001  0.003***  
              (0.037)  (0.248)  (0.070)  (0.129)  (0.966)  (0.003)  
LnMulaid  -0.176  -0.086  -0.121  -0.181*  - 
0.331***  
- 
0.210***  
-0.170  -0.138  -0.112  -0.171*  - 
0.324***  
-0.206***  
  (0.128)  (0.788)  (0.391)  (0.095)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.155)  (0.672)  (0.475)  (0.099)  (0.009)  (0.000)  
Unclter × LnMulaid  - 
0.011***  
-0.022  - 
0.017***  
-0.011  -0.002  - 
0.006***  
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.001)  (0.111)  (0.008)  (0.120)  (0.747)  (0.000)              
Totter×LnMulaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.001**  -0.0007  -0.001*  -0.002*  -0.001  -0.002***  
              (0.018)  (0.703)  (0.099)  (0.053)  (0.372)  (0.000)  
LnTrade  -0.363  -1.009  -0.740**  -0.217  0.073  0.371***  -0.367  -0.922  -0.730*  -0.230  0.216  0.374***  
  (0.192)  (0.196)  (0.034)  (0.431)  (0.781)  (0.005)  (0.190)  (0.222)  (0.060)  (0.374)  (0.432)  (0.008)  
LnInflation  -0.045  -0.268  -0.084  -0.011  0.062  0.098*  -0.039  -0.452*  -0.082  -0.018  0.125  0.107*  
  (0.633)  (0.286)  (0.489)  (0.914)  (0.592)  (0.054)  (0.688)  (0.068)  (0.512)  (0.853)  (0.314)  (0.090)  
LnInfrastructure   0.208  0.383  0.037  0.198  0.128  0.001  0.221  0.295  0.036  0.285*  0.099  0.005  
  (0.244)  (0.455)  (0.864)  (0.247)  (0.503)  (0.987)  (0.215)  (0.537)  (0.875)  (0.077)  (0.615)  (0.962)  
LnXrate (Exchange rate)  - 
0.003***  
-0.049  -0.063  0.024  0.071  0.028  -0.005  -0.087  -0.056  0.034  0.062  0.020  
  (0.000)  (0.714)  (0.195)  (0.532)  (0.129)  (0.237)  (0.904)  (0.514)  (0.281)  (0.354)  (0.207)  (0.470)  
Ln (Political globalisation)   2.043***  4.671***  3.279***  2.382***  0.096  0.364  2.049***  4.317***  3.199***  2.361***  0.456  0.433  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.875)  (0.254)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.471)  (0.212)  
Civil Conflicts   0.103  0.055  0.090  0.042  0.067  0.122***  0.134  0.090  0.127  0.163**  0.085  0.183***  
  (0.185)  (0.792)  (0.315)  (0.558)  (0.420)  (0.000)  (0.144)  (0.704)  (0.258)  (0.033)  (0.367)  (0.000)  
             
             
Pseudo R²/R²  0.075  0.116  0.077  0.0482  0.054  0.058  0.074  0.114  0.074  0.048  0.057  0.062  
Fisher  7.25***  
          5.60***            
Observations   444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  444  
             
 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo 
R² for quantile regression. Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Fuel Exports is least.  
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4.2 Robustness checks   
In order to avoid treating values in fuel exports as missing data and hence mitigate a potential 
bias, we perform a robustness check with logarithm (1+fuel export) as dependent variable. As 
shown in Table 3, with the robustness check, significant positive marginal effects are now 
apparent in bottom quintiles of regressions corresponding to domestic terrorism, transnational 
terrorism and total terrorism. (i) For domestic terrorism, the positive interactive effects are 
apparent in the 10th and 50th quintiles with respective modifying thresholds of 2(0.002/0.001) 
and 8(0.016/0.002). (ii) With respect to transnational terrorism, the positive interactive impacts 
are apparent in the 10th and 25th quintiles with respective thresholds of 4.785 (0.067/0.014) and 
6 (0.048/0.008). (iii) In relation to total terrorism, we find a positive interactive effect 
exclusively in the 10th quintile with a corresponding threshold of 3(0.003/0.001).  The computed 
thresholds make economic sense and are of policy relevance because they are within the range 
(0.765 to 8.362) provided by the summary statistics.  The same robustness exercise is conducted 
for findings in Table 2 to obtain results in Table 4 which are consistent with baseline regressions 
because the interaction effects between multilateral aid and terrorism dynamics are significantly 
negative, with the exception of transnational terrorism in the RHS of Panel A. The 
corresponding threshold of 4.545 (0.050/0.011) is within the policy range (-1.249 to 7.105) of 
multilateral aid    provided by the summary statistics.    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 3: Fuel Exports, Bilateral Aid, Terrorism   
 
             
Constant  - 
3.378***  
-0.236**  - 
2.316***  
- 
4.379***  
-6.278**  -3.502*  - 
3.445***  
-0.364**  - 
2.494***  
- 
5.335***  
-5.810*  -1.685  
  (0.004)  (0.037)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.031)  (0.052)  (0.003)  (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.073)  (0.373)  
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Domter  0.006  - 
0.002***  
-0.003  0.016**  0.013  0.006  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.449)  (0.000)  (0.273)  (0.028)  (0.257)  (0.345)              
Tranater  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.056  - 
0.067***  
-0.048*  0.145***  0.092  -0.038  
              (0.287)  (0.000)  (0.058)  (0.003)  (0.445)  (0.623)  
LnBilaid  0.053  0.017***  0.116***  0.168**  0.143  -0.136  0.058  0.017**  0.112***  0.221***  0.112  -0.210**  
  (0.471)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.410)  (0.182)  (0.436)  (0.023)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.566)  (0.042)  
Domter× LnBilaid  -0.001  0.001***  0.0009  -0.002*  -0.002  -0.001  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.426)  (0.000)  (0.109)  (0.059)  (0.246)  (0.116)              
Tranater×LnBilaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.009  0.014***  0.008**  -0.021**  -0.017  0.004  
              (0.316)  (0.000)  (0.047)  (0.014)  (0.456)  (0.757)  
Control variables   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
             
Pseudo R²/R²  0.134  0.028  0.099  0.137  0.080  0.074  0.134  0.020  0.097  0.138  0.078  0.067  
Fisher   12.49***  
          12.87***            
Observations   540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  
  
  
 
  
 
  Q.75  Q.90  Q.10  Q.75  Q.90  
             
Constant  - 
3.335***  
- 
0.440***  
- 
2.666***  
- 
5.216***  
-5.867*  -1.248  - 
3.397***  
-0.228  - 
2.356***  
- 
4.858***  
-6.314**  -3.531*  
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.055)  (0.507)  (0.004)  (0.102)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.028)  (0.070)  
Unclter   0.061  0.001  -0.004  0.107*  0.113  0.107**  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.355)  (0.544)  (0.783)  (0.054)  (0.363)  (0.031)              
Totter  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.005  - 
0.003***  
-0.002  0.016**  0.012  0.008  
              (0.400)  (0.000)  (0.360)  (0.010)  (0.223)  (0.183)  
LnBilaid  0.053  0.033***  0.137***  0.195***  0.055  -0.206**  0.055  0.027***  0.116***  0.196***  0.144  -0.133  
  (0.467)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.762)  (0.035)  (0.457)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.402)  (0.231)  
Unclter ×LnBilaid  -0.011  0.0006  0.0004  -0.016*  -0.021  - 
0.023***  
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.298)  (0.204)  (0.889)  (0.097)  (0.340)  (0.003)              
Totter×LnBilaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.001  0.001***  0.0007  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002**  
              (0.371)  (0.000)  (0.186)  (0.027)  (0.213)  (0.042)  
Control variables   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
             
             
Pseudo R²/R²  0.135  0.015  0.095  0.137  0.082  0.076  0.134  0.026  0.098  0.138  0.080  0.073  
Fisher   12.63***  
          12.51***            
Observations   540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  540  
             
 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² 
for quantile regression. Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Fuel Exports is least.  
  
                        
Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism    
            Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) 
  Total Terrorism (Totter)   
  OLS 
  Q.10   Q.25   Q.50   OLS   Q.25   Q.50   
21  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table  4: Fuel Exports, Multilateral aid, Terrorism   
 
  
 
  
 
  
                    
Dependent Variable: ln (1+ Fuel Exports)   
 
 
          Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism     
       
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter)  Transnational Terrorism (Tranater)  
 
 
  
 
Constant  
 
OLS  
 
Q.10  
 
Q.25  
 
Q.50  
 
Q.75  
 
Q.90  
 
OLS  
 
Q.10  
 
Q.25  
 
Q.50  
 
Q.75  
 
Q.90  
 
- 
3.193***  
 
-0.161  
 
- 
2.604***  
 
- 
3.348***  
 
-5.064*  
 
-2.835  
 
- 
3.225***  
 
-0.352**  
 
- 
2.427***  
 
-3.968***  
 
-4.505*  
 
-1.200  
  (0.005)  (0.073)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.081)  (0.146)  (0.005)  (0.039-  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.064)  (0.454)  
Domter  0.005***  0.002***  0.007***  0.007**  -0.286**  0.002  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.047)  (0.278)              
Tranater  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.034**  -0.003*  0.072***  0.060**  0.006  -0.050***  
              (0.023)  (0.054)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.851)  (0.003)  
LnMulaid  -0.101  -0.001  0.021  0.033  -0.001  - 
0.276***  
-0.100  -0.007  0.022  0.055  -0.287**  -0.280***  
  (0.117)  (0.818)  (0.506)  (0.629)  (0.301)  (0.001)  (0.120)  (0.445)  (0.488)  (0.401)  (0.020)  (0.000)  
Domter×LnMulaid  - 
0.001***  
0.0002***  - 
0.001***  
-0.001  -0.127  - 
0.002***  
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.119)  (0.648)  (0.003)              
Tranater×LnMulaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.010**  0.002***  - 
0.011***  
-0.012*  -0.008  0.011*  
              (0.023)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.058)  (0.338)  (0.086)  
Control variables   
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
Yes  
  
 
Pseudo R²/R²  
 
0.148  
 
0.021  
 
0.092  
 
0.135  
 
0.096  
 
0.082  
 
13.83  
 
0.007  
 
0.089  
 
0.136  
 
0.097  
 
0.079  
Fisher  15.06***  
          13.83***            
Observations   536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) 
            
Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
           
   Total Terrorism (Totter) 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
OLS  
   
 Q.10  Q.25  Q.50  Q.75  Q.90  OLS  Q.10  Q.25  Q.50  Q.75  
Q.90  
             
Constant  - 
3.157***  
-0.196*  - 
2.433***  
- 
3.534***  
-3.604  -0.951  - 
3.194***  
-0.132*  - 
2.639***  
-3.383**  -4.722  -2.900  
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  (0.006)  (0.099)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.190)  (0.637)  (0.005)  (0.079)  (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.112)  (0.132)  
Unclter   0.046***  0.079***  0.075***  0.066***  0.022  0.009  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.698)  (0.658)              
Totter  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.004***  0.001***  0.006***  0.006*  0.0006  0.001  
              (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.056)  (0.891)  (0.402)  
LnMulaid  -0.104*  -0.002  0.020  0.044  -0.281**  - 
0.270***  
-0.099  -0.001  0.021  0.037  -0.288*  -0.271***  
  (0.099)  (0.690)  (0.587)  (0.467)  (0.048)  (0.001)  (0.125)  (0.740)  (0.499)  (0.587)  (0.051)  (0.001)  
Unclter ×LnMulaid  - 
0.009***  
-0.011***  - 
0.011***  
- 
0.011***  
-0.006  -0.006**  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.440)  (0.030)              
Totter×LnMulaid  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  - 
0.001***  
0.00009  
***  
-0.0009  
***  
-0.001  -0.007  -0.001***  
              (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.178)  (0.462)  (0.003)  
Control variables   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
                          
             
Pseudo R²/R²  0.150  0.022  0.097  0.140  0.096  0.079  0.149  0.019  0.092  0.136  0.096  0.083  
Fisher  17.93***  
          15.28***            
Observations   536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  536  
             
 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo 
R² for quantile regression. Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Fuel Exports is least.  
  
The effects of terrorism are both positive and negative across quintiles and 
specifications.  Evidence of causality flowing from terrorism to fuel exports is broadly in 
accordance with a stream of the engaged literature, particularly Nitsch and Schumacher (2004); 
Richardson (2004) and De Sousa et al. (2009ab).   
 Consistent with the motivation of this study which has been partially based on the need to 
compare results with previous studies that have employed the same periodicity and sample, we 
briefly engage in how our findings improve the existing literature on linkages between 
macroeconomic indicators and terrorism. First, it is important to note  that (i) Bandyopadhyay 
et al (2014) and Efobi et al (2015) have used the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and 
(ii) Asongu et al. (2015) have used a QR strategy to assess how foreign aid could be used to 
mitigate the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. While Efobi et al. (2015) have extended 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) using a more robust GMM technique and conditioning the nexuses 
on corruption-control levels in recipient countries, Asongu et al. (2015) have extended the two 
underlying studies by using QR to assess the relationships throughout the conditional 
distributions of FDI.   
 It should be noted that the results of latter studies have not been in support of  Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014), especially, on (i) an exclusively negative terrorism-FDI nexus and (ii) a positive 
impact on FDI from aid-terrorism interactions. Results of the present study have improved 
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existing knowledge in this stream of literature by: (i) employing fuel exports as the dependent 
variable; (ii) partially validating the results of Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) on the impact of 
aid, terrorism and corresponding interactions on macroeconomic indicators and (iii) partially 
confirming the positions of Efobi et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2015) that the underlying 
effects of the independent indicators of interest on macroeconomic variables cannot be a priori 
established from intuition because they depend on, among others, the dependent variable, 
methodology and distribution of the dependent variable.   
As a policy implication, it is important to first establish the nexus between foreign aid 
and fuel exports before employing the former to mitigate the potentially negative effect of 
terrorism on the latter. While the policy instrument of bilateral aid is most relevant in countries 
with below-median fuel exports, the policy instrument of multilateral aid is effective with 
respect to transnational terrorism in countries with the highest levels of fuel exports.   
  
4. 2 Managerial implications for multinational companies  
It is apparent from intuition that terrorism increases the cost of the risk of doing business, 
regardless of the nature of the business. Conversely, we have established in the study that (i) 
terrorism could both positively and negatively affect fuel exports and (ii) the potentially 
instrumental role of foreign aid in mitigating the effect of terrorism on fuel exports does not 
withstand empirical scrutiny throughout the conditional distribution of fuel exports.   
While the negative effects of terrorism on fuel exports are consistent with the intuition 
motivating the study, we have also established that terrorism has a positive influence on fuel 
exports in some quintiles. This tendency is supported by the findings of De Sousa et al. (2009b) 
who established that remote terrorism positively affects some dynamics of trade. Moreover, on 
a more substantive note, the intuition for the positive effect has basis in the assumption that 
some investors in natural resources may be inclined to invest more in the fuel industry if they 
anticipate higher returns in the short-, medium- and long-terms, relative to the present risk of 
terrorism. More contemporary examples with which to substantiate this proposition include: (i) 
growing investments from China in the Nigerian Delta region despite evolving threats from the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Obi, 2008) and (ii) China’s 
unrelenting presence in South Sudan, in spite of growing violence, essentially because crude 
oil from South Sudan accounts for about 5 percent of fuel imports into China (Aguirre, 2014). 
This interpretation follows from Elu and Price (2010) on China’s long-term strategy, which 
entails an oil diplomacy requiring continuous engagement with countries that are characterised 
by violence, internal/civil conflicts and political strife.   
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As a policy implication, terrorism may induce positive effects on some commodity 
exports. Managers of MNCs should therefore be aware of the fact that terrorism may either 
positively or negatively influence fuel exports and in situations where the effect is negative, 
development assistance may not be so much of an instrumental policy tool in dampening the 
perilous effects on fuel exports. Hence, it is up to these MNCs to take the necessary measures 
to decrease the negative effects of terrorism on their business operations. Given that MNCs are 
often the target of terrorism, especially in oil-rich countries, engaging in corporate practices 
that are friendly to human rights and environmental protection could send a positive signal to 
the population that the MNCs have inclusive and sustainable development plans for local 
communities. Improving Corporate Social Responsibility standards is a step in this direction.   
 Whereas terrorism may not unequivocally disrupt fuel exports as has been established in this 
study, MNCs need to take preventive steps in order to reduce potentially damaging effects on 
their cost of doing business. Five main preventive measures may be exploited. First, the 
amelioration of physical security embodies equipment, plant and personnel, especially in places 
of higher risks. Second, security consultants often provide very valuable insights into politico-
economic risks associated with areas in which MNCs are operating. Such insights are important 
for informed decision-making. Third, since the global supply chains of MNCs may be exposed 
to attacks, improving security in transportation networks is vital, though very difficult. Fourth, 
a measure by which MNCs can mitigate cost could be to reduce and/or avoid investment in 
areas that are likely to be heavily affected by terrorism. Fifth, uncertainty associated with 
politically-risky investment environments can be mitigated by subscribing to insurance 
schemes.   
5. Conclusion and Further Research   
This study has employed quantile regressions to assess the conditional role of foreign 
aid in reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports in 78 developing 
countries for the period 1984-2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid indicators have been used 
whereas terrorism has included: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. 
The following findings have been established.  First, with the exception of unclear terrorism, 
bilateral aid can be used to mitigate the potentially negative effect of terrorism on fuel exports 
in bottom quintiles of the fuel export distribution. Second, multilateral aid can be used to reduce 
the negative effect of transnational terrorism on fuel exports exclusively in the highest (90th) 
quintile of fuel exports. The corresponding modifying thresholds are within policy ranges 
disclosed by the summary statistics.  While the policy instrument of bilateral aid is most relevant 
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in countries with below-median fuel exports, the policy instrument of multilateral aid is 
effective with respect to transnational terrorism in countries with the highest levels of fuel 
exports.  
The resulting managerial implications which are consistent with Oh and Oetzel (2016) 
can be summarised in the following.  Since, terrorism augments social unrest and imposes 
additional costs to the doing of business, managers of Multinational Companies (MNCs) can 
more effectively lessen the potentially damaging effects on their operations by leveraging on 
the experience of host governments in the mitigation of negative externalities of terrorism on 
development outcomes. One approach by which host governments could fight terrorism is by 
reliance on foreign aid flows. In the absence of robust evidence that such foreign aid can be 
instrumental for the purpose of reducing terrorism, MNCs need to consolidate preventive 
measures.  
There is obviously room for further research in (i) assessing channels through which 
terrorism negatively and positively influences fuel exports and (ii) distinguishing development 
assistance by sectors in order to improve the extant of knowledge on how aidspecific categories 
influence the established interconnections.   
Appendices  
  
Appendix 1: Definition and source of variables  
 
Variables  
 
Signs  
 
Definitions  
 
Sources  
 
Fuel Export   
 
FuelExp  
 
Ln. Fuel Export (as a % of Merchandise Export)  
 
  
 
Trade Openness   
 
Infrastructure   
 
Inflation   
 
Exchange rate  
 
Bilateral Aid   
 
Multilateral Aid   
 
Domestic terrorism  
 
LnTrade  
 
LnTel   
 
LnInflation  
 
LnXrate   
 
LnBilaid  
 
LnMulaid  
 
Domter  
 
Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP)  
 
Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people)  
 
Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual)  
 
Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD)  
 
Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD)  
 
Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD)  
 
Number of Domestic terrorism incidents  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015)  
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Transnational 
terrorism  
 
Unclear terrorism   
 
Tranater  
 
Unclter  
 
Number of Transnational terrorism incidents  
  
 
Number of terrorism incidents whose category is unclear  
 
Total terrorism   
 
Totter  
 
Total number of terrorism incidents   
 
 
Political 
globalisation  
 
LnPolglob   
 
Ln. of  Index of political globalisation   
 
 
Internal conflicts   
 
 
Civcon  
 
 
Index of  internal civil conflicts   
  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.   
  
Appendix 2: Summary statistics   
 
         
  Mean  S.D  Minimum  Maximum  
 
Obs  
         
Fuel Export (ln)  1.007  2.785  -11.366  4.585  
 
503  
 
      
Trade Openness (ln)  4.118  0.534  2.519  5.546  612  
      
Infrastructure (ln)  1.475  1.017  0.091  4.031  616  
      
Inflation (ln)  2.414  1.384  -3.434  9.136  581  
      
Exchange rate (ln)  2.908  3.870  -22.121  21.529  618  
      
Bilateral Aid (ln)  5.181  1.286  0.765  8.362  602  
      
Multilateral Aid (ln)  4.163  1.518  -1.249  7.105  600  
      
Domestic terrorism  14.292  45.179  0  419.33  624  
      
Transnational terrorism  2.316  6.127  0  63  624  
      
Unclear terrorism  1.972  7.479  0  86  624  
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Total terrorism  18.581  55.595  0  477.66  624  
      
Political globalisation (ln)  4.036  0.301  2.861  4.530  624  
      
Internal conflicts  0.965  1.906  0  10  615  
      
 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations.  
  
  
 Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix  
                           
LnFuelExp  LnTrade  LnTel  LnInflation  LnXrate  LnBilad  LnMulaid  Domter  Tranater  Unclter  Totter  LnPolglob  Civcon    
1.000   -0.106  0.095   0.016   -0.002  0.230   -0.090  0.044   0.066  0.013   0.044   0.207   0.043  LnFuelExp  
   1.000  0.296   -0.230   0.043  -0.267   -0.289  -0.236   -0.206  -0.240   -0.246   -0.122   -0.299  LnTrade  
     1.000   -0.121   -0.191  -0.376   -0.514  0.023   0.072  -0.003   0.026   0.268   -0.183  LnTel  
         1.000   -0.284  -0.047   -0.023  0.171   0.164  0.091   0.169   -0.150   0.185  LnInflation  
            1.000  0.114   0.183  -0.081   -0.001  -0.050   -0.073   0.089   -0.120  LnXrate  
              1.000   0.721  0.116   0.088  0.093   0.117   0.233   0.259  LnBilaid  
                 1.000  0.014   -0.039  0.069   0.016   0.167   0.194  LnMulaid  
                   1.000   0.743  0.733   0.993   0.127   0.428  Domter  
                      1.000  0.528   0.785   0.120   0.418  Tranater  
                        1.000   0.789   0.072   0.347  Unclter  
                           1.000   0.126   0.441  Totter  
                              1.000   -0.024  LnPolglob  
                                 1.000  Civcon  
                       
 
  LnFuelExp: Fuel Export.  LnTrade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  LnTotaid: Total aid.  
Domter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total 
number of terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts.    
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